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Abstract  In experiments individual risk attitudes can be induced by applying the 
binary lottery-technique (one can achieve a high or low payoff and influence only the 
probability of winning the high payoff). This also seems to be the only way to guar-
antee common knowledge of idiosyncratic risk attitudes, assumed in most economic 
game models involving risk. We report on experiments whose results support the hy-
pothesis that behavior does not change much when playing for money or probability. 
When comparing decision alternatives one often seems to substitute final goals like 
monetary expectation by more easily accessible sub-goals like winning probability. 
JEL Classification  D14, D18, C3 
Keywords  risk preference, lottery choice, experiment, binary lottery technique 
1. Introduction 
Let us refer to actions implying positive probability for more than one 
monetary payoff level as lottery choices. Like in real life many experiments 
require to choose among lotteries. If in such situations one wants to unambi-192  Homo Oeconomicus 22(2): 191–209 (2005) 
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guously define optimal behavior, one usually relies on commonly known risk 
attitudes.1 Whatever one assumes: if experimental observations deviate from 
the benchmark solution, the question comes up: Can these deviations be ex-
plained by risk attitudes other than the assumed ones?  
Some results exclude, of course, such explanations. If the responder in an 
ultimatum game rejects a positive offer, this contradicts any behavior based 
on the assumption that more money is better than less money.2 But in social 
interaction involving risk many behavioral patterns may be consistent with 
expected utility maximization. If any risk attitude consistent with expected 
utility theory is possible, (commonly known) rationality is not very informa-
tive and may even become unfalsifiable. 
To avoid the ambiguity of the normative solution and to counter the ar-
gument that deviations from solution behavior can be explained by individ-
ual risk preferences, in experiments one naturally would like to control for 
individual risk preferences, e.g. by inducing risk neutrality. This can be 
achieved by the binary lottery technique: A participant either can win a large 
or a small monetary payoff or prize. If actions influence monetary rewards 
only via the probability for winning the large prize, an optimal choice clearly 
has to maximize this probability regardless of one’s risk preferences for 
money. It has to be assumed merely that the decision maker prefers more to 
less money and obeys the laws of probability theory, e.g. when deriving the 
overall winning probability in case of multiple chance moves.  
Of course, one can also induce other risk attitudes than risk neutrality in 
the same way, e.g. by letting participants earn a point score which is mono-
tonically, but not necessarily linearly related to the probability of winning the 
large prize (see, for instance, in a financial setting, Dittrich et al., forth-
coming). Since in our experiment we induce risk neutrality, this is not dis-
cussed here in more detail. 
If choices assign positive probability to various events influencing the 
probabilities of winning the large prize, a participant in an experiment using 
the binary lottery technique has to choose among compound lotteries ac-
cording to which success depends on more than one chance move. In our 
study we restrict attention to simple compound lotteries, namely where par-
              
1 It is quite another matter that most game models (typically in auction theory, an exception 
are principal-agent models) and experimental benchmark solutions (see the relevant sub-
chapters in Kagel and Roth (eds.), 1995) rely on identical risk preferences of all interacting 
parties, especially if any kind of asymmetry questions basic results, e.g. the equivalence of various 
auction forms. 
2 Note, however, that inequity aversion, another idiosyncratic preference aspect, can account 
for such behaviour (see Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, and Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). W. Güth, E. van Damme and M. Weber: Risk Aversion on Probabilities  193 
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ticipants choose among a one or a two stage lottery. Whereas a one stage lot-
tery simply assigns positive probability for at least two monetary prizes, the 
first stage of a two stage lottery offers a probability p-chance to win a lottery 
or nothing. In the second stage the lottery yields an amount x with a q-chance 
and nothing otherwise. Such a two-stage lottery will be denoted by L. Com-
pare this to a one-stage lottery  ′ L  yielding x with a w-chance and nothing 
otherwise, see Figure 1. 
According to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) this two-stage lottery is 
equivalent to the one-stage lottery if w is equal to pq. This equivalence is a 
direct consequence of the substitution principle, or more specifically of the 
axiom of reduction of compound lotteries. The basic choice paradigm in Fig-
ure 1 is important for quite a number of reasons. 
The binary lottery technique was already suggested by Smith (1961). It has 
been used experimentally by Roth and Malouf (1979) who were interested in 
testing the axioms of the bargaining solution suggested by Nash (1953).3 Let 
us demonstrate the idea with the help of lottery  ′ L  in Figure 1. Instead of re-
ceiving some amount x, subjects receive a w-chance of winning the amount x. 
In case they receive another w’-chance of winning the amount x their overall 
chance of winning is  ′ + ww  (assuming  1 ww ′ + ≤ ). According to EUT the 
expected utility of these prospects is () ( ) ( 1 ) ( 0 ) ww u x ww u ′ ′ + +−− . Since 
utilities are only unique up to positive affine linear transformations, this util-
ity can be renormalized into ′ + ww  by setting  () 1 ux=  and  (0) 0 u = . 
This demonstrates that in EUT risk considerations are expressed exclu-
sively by the shape of the function  () u ⋅ , i.e. by the evaluation of sure mone-
tary wins. If  () u ⋅  is concave, the decision maker is risk averse, whereas risk 
loving requires convexity of  () u ⋅ . EUT leaves no room for ″evaluating″ prob-
              
3 It has recently been more thoroughly explored by Selten et al. (1999) where, like in our 
study, the focus is decision theoretic. The unique chance of inducing commonly known 
idiosyncratic risk attitudes by applying the binary lottery technique is not discussed at all. 
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abilities, e.g. in the sense of evaluating probabilities w by  () vw  according to 
some non-linear and monotonic function  () v ⋅ . We refer to such functions 
() v ⋅  as risk attitudes for winning probabilities (also in prospect theory, see 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, probabilities are transformed though this is 
not justified by “risk aversion”). In case of a concave evaluation function  () v ⋅  
we speak of risk aversion on probabilities. Of course, EUT also claims that 
when using the binary lottery technique different individuals must decide in 
the same way between alternative prospects relying on the same probabilities. 
Consider, for example, the choice between L and  ′ L  in Figure 1. Here the 
decision maker has a definite w-chance of winning versus a p-chance, i.e. a 
risky chance, of a q-chance of winning. According to EUT decision makers 
have to be indifferent between L and  ′ L  in case wp q = . The axiom support-
ing this is the axiom of reduction of compound lotteries, i.e. in a decision tree 
the probabilities can be multiplied through. Comparing lotteries L and  ′ L  
offers a direct test of this axiom in the most simple settings. More impor-
tantly, the choice paradigm presented in Figure 1 allows to test whether the 
binary lottery technique induces risk neutral behavior and whether risk atti-
tudes can be reflected by the evaluations of sure monetary wins alone or re-
quire also to evaluate winning probabilities by a function  () v ⋅  as described 
above. 
The concept of ambiguity can also be related to the lotteries in Figure 1. In 
general ambiguity is defined as the uncertainty a decision maker has about 
his probability judgments. If a decision maker is averse towards this uncer-
tainty he is said to be ambiguity averse. Ambiguity aversion is best presented 
in the famous Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961, see Camerer and Weber 1992 
for an overview on ambiguity research). For the purpose of our analysis am-
biguity can be related to the maximal number of successive chance moves. 
Thus a two stage-lottery is more ambiguous than a one stage-lottery. This 
could mean that one prefers the simple lottery  ′ L  over the two stage-lottery L 
in Figure 1 even when pq is larger than w. Theories based on second order 
probabilities weigh the possible probabilities of the second chance moves 
nonlinearly and thus exhibit risk aversion toward (second-order) probabili-
ties (Camerer and Weber 1992, provide an overview on this approach). The 
choice problem in Figure 1 provides a direct test of ambiguity aversion in the 
sense of an aversion against more complex stochastic events. 
In our experimental study subjects received two choice sets similar to 
those in Figure 1. The aim was to investigate to which degree subjects prefer a 
one-stage lottery over an equivalent two-stage lottery. Concerning the binary 
lottery technique our basic conjecture was that many decision makers will 
not change behavior at all. In particular they would still exhibit some form of 
risk aversion, if winning probabilities are used as payoffs instead of money. W. Güth, E. van Damme and M. Weber: Risk Aversion on Probabilities  195 
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After learning about their basic concerns experimental subjects seem to en-
gage the task of making a reasonable choice. It is quite likely that this task is 
completed by some general problem solving algorithm like, for instance, as-
piration adjustment. This could be operative regardless of the nature of the 
basic concerns, whether they be sure monetary wins or just winning prob-
abilities.  
Of course, the binary lottery technique can only address the concerns of 
those who are basically believers in the rationality of human decision making. 
They no longer can argue that one does not control for risk attitudes. For 
those (e.g. Selten et al., 1999), who doubt that human decision making is at all 
rational in the sense of the utility maximization paradigm (except for some 
rare situations), the binary lottery technique would only complicate the ex-
perimental design, e.g. by making it more complex and therefore also more 
ambiguous. 
In case of merely a few choice alternatives one has to expect a considerable 
proportion of rational choices. We will show is that non-optimal choices are 
far from being rare and that certain circumstances provoke more such 
choices. These can no longer be explained by risk attitudes in the narrow 
sense of EUT. In our view, this finding validates our general claim that be-
havioral risk attitude is a much broader concept than suggested by utility 
theory (EUT). Apparently human problem solving operates such that we 
compare decision alternatives to sub-goals and rely on our usual concerns 
like “beware of risk!”. 
2. Experimental design 
To test our hypotheses we used two choice settings. For the first setting, de-
noted by A, see the pair of alternatives presented in Figure 1. The amount x 
to be won was set to be DM 40 or hfl 50 depending on whether the experi-
ment was run in Germany or in the Netherlands4. We have used two pairs of 
alternatives in setting A, denoted by A1 and A2, respectively, with the same 
probability w of winning for the one-stage lottery  ′ L  of 0.25. The two-stage 
probabilities of L were  =0.75 p , and  0.35 q = , thus  0.2625 pq =  in case of A1 
and for A2 also  0.75 p = , but  0.40 q = , thus  0.30 pq = . With w less than pq, 
EUT predicts a clear preference for  ′ L . We varied q to gain an understanding 
of the possible strength of risk aversion on probabilities. In the instructions, 
              
4 DM 40  (about 20 EUR) correspond to approximately  hfl 45. At the time of the experiment 
the amount was equal to $ 25. We used hfl 50 instead of hfl 45 as a money amount in order to put 
equal burden for calculation on both subject pools. 196  Homo Oeconomicus 22(2): 191–209 (2005) 
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see Appendix A, we never directly spoke about probabilities. We simply de-
scribed urns, number of coloured balls in urns and the winning colour.  
In the second choice setting, denoted by B, we presented subjects with two 
pairs B1 and B2 of alternatives L and  ′ L  as shown in Figure 2. Both pairs of 
alternatives paid upon winning DM 20 or hfl 25, thus yielding a similar 
monetary expectation as those alternatives in choice setting A. Alternative L 
is a two-stage lottery: In the first stage a 50-50 lottery determines whether the 
winning probability in the second stage is 0.1 or 0.9. The one stage alternative 
′ L  offers a  0.48 w =  of winning in setting B1, and a  0.40 w =  chance of win-
ning in setting B2. The probabilities of not winning (drawing a black ball: wbl , 
drawing a white ball: wwh) were  1 0.42 b w =  and  0.10 wh w =  in setting B1 and 
1 0.50 b w =  and  0.10 wh w =  in setting B2. Again, the probability of winning in 
the two-stage lottery, equal to 0.5, was slightly larger than for the one-stage 
lottery in setting B1 and considerably larger in setting B2. Again one would 
expect a stronger defection from the rational choice L for B1 than for B2. Since 
the superiority of L over  ′ L  seems to be more obvious for Figure 2 than for 
Figure 1, we expected stronger risk aversion on probabilities for Figure 1 than 
for Figure 2. This, however, was not confirmed by our experimental data. 
Each participant had to decide upon one pair of choice questions which 
was either A1, A2, B1 or B2. In addition to having subjects select one alterna-
tive which subsequently was played for real, we asked subjects to state their 
preference for all four choices (A1, A2, B1, and B2). We also asked the subjects 
to choose from a set of three alternatives: two one-stage lotteries and a sure 
amount5. This choice allowed us to classify subjects according to their risk 
aversion in the classical sense (of EUT). 
              
5 Frankfurt: Alternative 1: 0.25 vs. 0.75-chance of winning DM 80 or DM 8; Alternative 2: 
0.25 vs. 0.75-chance of winning DM 96 or nothing; Alternative 3: Sure amount of winning DM 
25. Tilburg: Alternative 1: 0.25 vs. 0.75-chance of winning hfl 80 or hfl 8; Alternative 2: 0.25 vs. 
0.75-chance of winning hfl 110. or nothing; Alternative 3: Sure amount of winning hfl 20. 
Figure 2  Basic choice setting, part 2 
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More specifically, the experiment was performed in two ways: Once par-
ticipants first received their decision form (see Appendix A for A1 and A2 and 
Appendix B for B1 and B2) which confronted them with their only pair of 
choice alternatives. After collecting these decision forms they were asked to 
fill out the questionnaire (Appendix C) confronting them with the three al-
ternatives, described in footnote 5, as well as with all four pairs of alternatives 
A1, A2, B1 and B2. Thus a participant encountered in the questionnaire among 
others also the same choice problem as on his decision form. The other pro-
cedure simply reversed the order of these two tasks, i.e. participants first an-
swered the questionnaire of Appendix C before deciding for the only actual 
choice alternative A1, A2, B1 or B2. 
Our design varies from other studies which have investigated risk aversion 
on probabilities. We use different probabilities, pay subjects, observe choices 
and, in addition, ask subjects for preference. Unrelated to the discussion 
about the binary lottery-technique there is quite a lot of research on ambigu-
ity effects, however, most of this research does not explicitly consider second 
order probabilities, exceptions are Bernasconi and Loomes (1992) and Kahn 
and Sarin (1988), see Davis and Pate-Cornell (1994) for an overview and 
theoretical models. There is also research showing violations of the reduction 
of compound lottery axiom, see, for example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
The binary lottery technique itself is also discussed by Rietz (1993) and Selten 
et al. (1999). We also do not try to induce other attitudes than risk neutrality 
like Dittrich et al. (forthcoming). 
We ran two major studies, one in the Netherlands (Tilburg) and one in 
Germany (Frankfurt/M.). In addition we performed two pilot experiments 
where we used slightly different probabilities. In both pilot experiments our 
student subjects had already taken advanced economics classes. One major 
experiment in Tilburg was run with 34 undergraduate students of 
econometrics. The other in Frankfurt was run with 82 “unspoilt”, 
undergraduate students. Subjects needed about 5 minutes to decide (for 
decision forms see Appendix A und B, respectively) and about 15 minutes to 
answer the questionnaire in Appendix C. At the end of the experiment one 
student was selected at random to perform the chance moves. 
3. Results 
3.1  Tilburg experiment 
The results of the experiment in Tilburg are listed in Table 1. In the Tilburg-
experiment all participants first were asked to decide and then to fill out the – 198  Homo Oeconomicus 22(2): 191–209 (2005) 
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in this case post-experimental  questionnaire. The labels L or  ′ L  correspond 
to those in Figure 1 and 2. The numbers in the rows “Decision Makers Only” 
are the hypothetical answers in the post-experimental questionnaire of those 
subjects who were actually confronted with this situation, “All Subjects” rep-
resent the hypothetical answers in the post experimental questionnaire of all 
subjects. The actual decisions are listed in the bottom line of Table 1. 
Numbers in bracket give the number of those decision makers whose deci-
sion is consistent in questionnaire and in real choice. 
The results show a remarkable consistency with the reduction of com-
pound lottery axiom. Subjects hardly show any risk aversion on probabilities. 
Altogether only 5 of 34 decisions were suboptimal. The relative proportion of 
suboptimal answers (17 of 136) is comparable. The results of Table 1 do not 
confirm our hypothesis of subjects being risk averse on probabilities. In ad-
dition we do not get any difference between either A vs. B or A1 and B1 vs. A2 
and B2. This result was almost identical to the results of both pilot experi-
ments where almost everyone chose the compound lottery with the higher 
probability of winning. Note the interesting effect that all subjects who made 
the “correct” choice in the real situation are consistent. Some of those who 
make the “wrong” choice when it is for money make the “correct” choice in 
the post-experimental questionnaire. Since the questionnaire came after the 
decision, this could be attributed to learning. 
3.2  Frankfurt experiment 
The experiments in Frankfurt were similar to the one in Tilburg except for 
one important detail. In Frankfurt we asked half of the subjects to fill out the 
questionnaire before the experiment and half of them after the experiment. 
The results of the Frankfurt study are presented in Table 2. The Table is 
similar to Table 1. The three rows labelled before (after) describe the data for 
Table 1  Results of the Tilburg experiment 
Setting  A1  A2  B1  B2 
Alternative  L'  L L' L L' L L' L 
Winning  Probability  0.25  0.2625 0.25 0.30 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.50 
Hypothetical  answers          
Decision Makers Only  0  10(8)  0  8(7)  0  9(9)  1(1)  6(5) 
All  subjects  5 29 2 32 2 32 8 26 
Decisions  2 8 1 7 0 9 2 5 W. Güth, E. van Damme and M. Weber: Risk Aversion on Probabilities  199 
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those subjects who did the decision before (after) the questionnaire.  
A first glance at Table 2 shows that relatively more subjects have preferred 
the one-stage lottery over the two-stage lottery than in the Tilburg Experi-
ment. Here 33% preferred  ′ L  and 67% preferred L. Remarkably this effect 
does not depend on the probability difference between one-stage and two-
stage lotteries (if at all it depends in the wrong direction). For the small 
difference, i.e. A1 and B1, 29% preferred  ′ L  and 38% preferred  ′ L  for the 
larger difference, i.e. A2 and B2. These results are also reflected in the 
questionnaire data.  
There is no apparent difference in the decision data between the A-setting 
(choosing between A1 and A2) and the B-setting (choosing between B1 and 
B2). However, the questionnaire data show that for the A-setting 32% of the 
subjects prefer the one-stage lottery. For the B-setting 56% of our subjects 
prefer the one-stage lottery with the lower chance of winning. This effect is 
driven by the decision data (one-stage: 25%) and the questionnaire data   
(one-stage: 67%) in the B1-setting. 
To further analyse the questionnaire data, it is interesting to check for 
effects of the order in which questionnaire and decision data were elicited. If 
the decision was done before the questionnaire, only 8 out of 41 subjects 
(19.5%) prefer the one-stage lottery. In case the questionnaire came first, 19 
out of 41 subjects (46.3%) prefer the one-stage lottery (different with p < 
0.02). It seems that making people think longer and confronting them with a 
variety of problems makes them more risk averse on probabilities.  
Table 2  Results of the Frankfurt experiment 
Setting  A1  A2  B1  B2 
Alternative  L'  L L L' L' L L' L 
Winning  Probability  0.25  0.2625 0.25 0.30 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.50 
Before 
Hypothetical  answers          
Decision  Makers  Only  3(2) 8(8) 2(1) 8(6) 4(0) 6(5) 1(0) 9(7) 
All  subjects  14 27  7  34 27 14 12 29 
Decisions  2 9 3 7 1 9 2 8 
After 
Hypothetical answers 
        
Decision  Makers  Only  4(4) 7(6) 4(3) 6(6) 7(4) 3(3) 7(6) 3(2) 
All  subjects  20 21 12 29 28 13 25 16 
Decisions  5 6    3 7 4 6 7 3 200  Homo Oeconomicus 22(2): 191–209 (2005) 
The latter effect might be related to variety seeking in choice behaviour: 
When first confronting a new choice problem one more often selects the 
better alternative. When, however, having made similar (even hypothetical) 
choices before, one is more likely to display variety in decisions. Evolutionar-
ily this could be related to betting on different states (of nature) in the theory 
of evolutionarily stable portfolios (see for an early study Blume and Easley, 
1992, in a financial setting). 
Finally we want to check whether there is some relation between the stated 
risk attitude in an EUT  sense and the choice behavior observed in the ex-
periment. Of course, the test is rather crude since participants could select 
only one of three alternatives presented in the questionnaire. But according 
to footnote 5, it seems justified to rank participants who in the questionnaire 
prefer Alternative 1 as risk neutral, those who prefer Alternative 2 as risk 
loving, and those choosing Alternative 3 as risk averse (according to standard 
EUT). According to this classification, we had 43 risk neutral, 9 risk loving, 
and 30 risk averse participants. The proportion of non-optimal choice, i.e. 
preference for the one-stage lottery with the smaller winning chance, is high-
est for risk lovers (44%), second highest for risk neutral participants (35%) 
and lowest for risk averse students (27%).6 This clearly confirms our intuition 
that risk aversion is behaviorally a much broader concept: The more risk 
averse according to standard utility theory somebody is, the less likely he 
avoids the more ambiguous two stage lottery. Or from the opposite point of 
view: Wrong decisions (in the sense of avoiding the compound lottery) in-
crease with an increasing willingness to accept risks in terms of standard util-
ity theory. 
4. Conclusion 
In our study we investigated if subjects show some risk aversion towards the 
uncertainty in probabilities. We hypothesized that contrary to EUT subjects 
would prefer lotteries which appear more certain but offer a (slightly) lower 
chance of winning than others. Subjects who were trained in economics fol-
lowed the prediction of EUT to high degree.7 Contrary, for subjects with little 
              
6 In Tilburg 26% of all subjects prefered Alternative 1 (expected value 26), 65% preferred 
Alternative 2 (expected value 27.5), and 9% preferred Alternative 3 (sure pay-off 20) thus mostly 
showing risk neutrality or risk seeking. As subjects gave choice data which was highly consistent 
with EUT, we could not find any difference in consistency depending on the alternative chosen. 
7 In Tilburg, the experiment was done with students in econometrics at the end of the first 
year who are used to quantitative techniques. In Frankfurt subjects were not exposed to 
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training in economics the rate of violation of EUT was about one third. We 
found that the number of violations depended on whether subjects were first 
asked to evaluate the whole choice set by a questionnaire. 
In the view of our results the following conclusions seem to be well sup-
ported: 
(i)  The binary lottery technique does not avoid that people’s risk attitude 
matters. All what it excludes is risk attitude in the narrow sense of ex-
pected utility theory. 
(ii) Economic education reduces significantly the share of suboptimal 
choices in simple decision tasks where participants usually invest 
considerable time for making just one decision. 
(iii) To develop a behavioral theory of risk choices we need a richer theory 
which does not only depend on (winning) probabilities and (monetary) 
prizes but captures how such probabilities are determined (e.g. as one 
stage or two stage lotteries). 
(iv)  In strategic interaction involving risk there is no easy and 
straightforward alternative to the binary lottery-technique when 
common knowledge of idiosyncratic risk attitudes is crucial. 
Our overall conclusion from all these points is that employing the binary 
lottery-technique is questionable (due to (i), (ii) and (iii)) but partly unavoid-
able (due to (iv)). Notice that for the binary lottery technique, as it was used 
in experiments, standard utility theory (EUT) can account for the non-opti-
mal choices (the choice of  ′ L ) only as behavioral noise which, furthermore, 
should be unrelated to the order of actually deciding and answering the 
questionnaire. As mentioned before the hypothesis that the order matters is, 
however, highly significant (p < 0.02). Human decision makers may be evo-
lutionarily programmed to display variety in choices since it guarantees long 
run survival even though, in expected terms, one alternative may be prefer-
able (see Blume and Easley, 1992). 
For the actual choices the largest difference of non-optimal choices – be-
tween B2, where 9 of 20 choices were wrong, and A2 with only 6 wrong (of 20 
choices) – is less dramatic. For all answers (“all subjects” in Table 2) the 
differences are, however, highly significant, e.g. for A2 only 19 of 82 answers 
are wrong whereas for B1 this number is 55 of 82 (p < 0.001). Furthermore, it 
is not clear why the correctness of EUT should be related to differences in 
                                                                                                                                          
econometric training before. Of course, such a conclusion denies the possibility of cross country 
effects which, in our view, are rather unlikely or minor compared to educational effects. 202  Homo Oeconomicus 22(2): 191–209 (2005) 
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training and/or cultural background to account for the different results of the 
Tilburg- and Frankfurt-experiment. Altogether this shows that conclusion (i) 
is well-supported by our experimental results. 
Especially conclusion (iii) will make it clear that a behavioral theory of 
risky choices will be strongly influenced by the psychological literature con-
cerning such choices. In our view, many psychological theories lend them-
selves in a straightforward way to an explanation of our results. If, for exam-
ple, a participant has chosen the suboptimal choice in the pre-experimental 
questionnaire he may repeat this choice in the experiment purely from an 
ego-defensive attitude to appear consistent. This combination of axiomatic 
approaches, psychological theory and experimental research should help us 
in the future to better understand people’s decision making. 
Appendix A 
Instructions of Experiment A, Choice Pair A1 
Code No._____ 
Please take off the attached card which contains your code number. You need 
it to collect your earnings. 
Instructions 
Thank you for participating in our experiment. You have the chance of win-
ning a monetary prize of: hfl 50 
If you do not win this monetary prize, you receive no payment at all. 
Whether you receive this prize or not depends on the option that you choose 
and the actions taken by the selector. The selector is one of your fellow stu-
dents. He has been appointed by chance. 
You have two options with different implications for your prospects of win-
ning this monetary prize: 
If you choose option XX, you will win your monetary prize if out of an urn 
containing 100 balls of which 25 are green and 75 are black the selector ran-
domly selects a green ball. 
If you choose option YY instead, you will win your monetary prize in case of 
the following two events: 
Firstly, the selector must randomly select a red ball out of an urn containing 
20 balls of which 15 are red and 5 are blue. W. Güth, E. van Damme and M. Weber: Risk Aversion on Probabilities  203 
11/07/2005 18:53  05-22-2 Güth1.doc
Secondly, i.e. only in case that a red ball has been selected in this way, the se-
lector must randomly select a green ball out of an urn containing 100 balls of 
which 35 are green and 65 are black. 
.......................................................................................................................................  
Please, decide now by indicating appropriately: 
I choose 
option  XX 
option  YY 
Hand in this form immediately after deciding, but keep the attached card 
containing your code number. 
Instructions of Experiment A, Choice Pair A2 
Code No._____ 
Please take off the attached card which contains your code number. You need 
it to collect your earnings. 
Instructions 
Thank you for participating in our experiment. You have the chance of win-
ning a monetary prize of: hfl 50 
If you do not win this monetary prize, you receive no payment at all. 
Whether you receive this prize or not depends on the option that you choose 
and the actions taken by the selector. The selector is one of your fellow stu-
dents. He has been appointed by chance. 
You have two options with different implications for your prospects of win-
ning this monetary prize: 
If you choose option XX, you will win your monetary prize if out of an urn 
containing 100 balls of which 25 are green and 75 are black the selector ran-
domly selects a green ball. 
If you choose option YY instead, you will win your monetary prize in case of 
the following two events: 
Firstly, the selector must randomly select a red ball out of an urn containing 
20 balls of which 15 are red and 5 are blue. 204  Homo Oeconomicus 22(2): 191–209 (2005) 
11/07/2005 18:53  05-22-2 Güth1.doc
Secondly, i.e. only in case that a red ball has been selected in this way, the se-
lector must randomly select a green ball out of an urn containing 100 balls of 
which 40 are green and 60 are black. 
.......................................................................................................................................  
Please, decide now by indicating appropriately: 
I choose: 
option  XX 
option  YY 
Hand in this form immediately after deciding, but keep the attached card 
containing your code number. 
Appendix B 
Instructions of Experiment A, Choice Pair B1 
Code No._____ 
Please take off the attached card which contains your code number. You need 
it to collect your earnings. 
Instructions 
Thank you for participating in our experiment. You have the chance of win-
ning a monetary prize of: hfl 25 
If you do not win this monetary prize, you receive no payment at all. 
Whether you receive this prize or not depends on the option that you choose 
and the actions taken by the selector. The selector is one of your fellow stu-
dents. He has been appointed by chance. 
You have two options with different implications for your prospects of win-
ning this monetary prize: 
If you choose option XX, you will win your monetary prize if out of an urn 
containing 100 balls of which 48 are green, 42 are black, and 10 are white,  the 
selector randomly selects a green ball. 
If you choose option YY instead, you will win your monetary prize according 
to the following rules: 
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tossing a fair coin. 
In case that urn__ has been selected in this way, the selector must randomly 
select a green ball out of urn__ containing 100 balls of which 10 are green and 
90 are black. If urn__ has been selected, a green ball must be chosen out of 
urn__ containing 100 balls of which 90 are green and 10 are black. 
.......................................................................................................................................  
Please, decide now by indicating appropriately: 
I choose 
option  XX 
option  YY 
Hand in this form immediately after deciding, but keep the attached card 
containing your code number. 
Instructions of Experiment B, Choice Pair B2 
Code No._____ 
Please take off the attached card which contains your code number. You need 
it to collect your earnings. 
Instructions 
Thank you for participating in our experiment. You have the chance of win-
ning a monetary prize of: hfl 25 
If you do not win this monetary prize, you receive no payment at all. 
Whether you receive this prize or not depends on the option that you choose 
and the actions taken by the selector. The selector is one of your fellow stu-
dents. He has been appointed by chance. 
You have two options with different implications for your prospects of win-
ning this monetary prize: 
If you choose option XX, you will win your monetary prize if out of an urn 
containing 100 balls of which 40 are green, 50 are black, and 10 are white,  the 
selector randomly selects a green ball. 
If you choose option YY instead, you will win your monetary prize according 
to the following rules: 
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tossing a fair coin. 
In case that urn__ has been selected in this way, the selector must randomly 
select a green ball out of urn__ containing 100 balls of which 10 are green and 
90 are black. If urn__ has been selected, a green ball must be chosen out of 
urn__ containing 100 balls of which 90 are green and 10 are black. 
.......................................................................................................................................  
Please, decide now by indicating appropriately: 
I choose 
option  XX 
option  YY 
Hand in this form immediately after deciding, but keep the attached card 
containing your code number. 
Appendix C 
Postexperimental questionnaire, C1 
The answers of the following questions do not influence your earnings as 
long as you answer them completely. If you do not fill in this questionnaire, 
we, unfortunately, have to exclude you from the experiment. 
Assume an urn containing 100 balls of which 25 are blue and 75 are yellow. 
Which of the following options would you choose? 
According to this option you would win hfl 80 in case a blue ball is randomly 
drawn whereas you would only win hfl 8 in case of a yellow ball. 
According to this option you would win hfl 88 in case a blue ball is randomly 
drawn whereas you would only win nothing in case of a yellow  ball. 
According to this option you would win hfl 20 regardless whether a blue or a 
yellow ball is randomly drawn. 
I prefer __ 
Please, try to briefly indicate your reasons for your decision: 
.......................................................................................................................................  
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Appendix C: Postexperimental Questionnaire, C2 
Please, indicate for the two different choice problems below whether you 
would prefer option __ or option __: 
(1)  In case of option__ you win a monetary prize of hfl 50 if out of an urn 
containing 100 balls of which 25 are green and 75 are black,  the selector ran-
domly selects a green ball. 
In case of option __ you win the same monetary prize of hfl 50 only in case of 
the following two events: 
Firstly, the selector must randomly select a red ball out of an urn containing 
20 balls of which 15 are red  and 5 are blue. 
Secondly, i.e. only in case that a red ball has been selected in this way, the se-
lector must randomly select a green ball out of an urn containing 100 balls of 
which 35 are green and 65 are black. 
I prefer __ 
(2)  In case of option__ you win a monetary prize of hfl 50 if out of an urn 
containing 100 balls of which 25 are green and 75 are black,  the selector ran-
domly selects a green ball. 
In case of option __ you win the same monetary prize of hfl 50 only in case of 
the following two events: 
Firstly, the selector must randomly select a red ball out of an urn containing 
20 balls of which 15 are red  and 5 are blue. 
Secondly, i.e. only in case that a red ball has been selected in this way, the se-
lector must randomly select a green ball out of an urn containing 100 balls of 
which 40 are green and 60 are black. 
I prefer __ 
Please, try to briefly indicate your reasons for your decision: 
.......................................................................................................................................  
.......................................................................................................................................  
Postexperimental Questionnaire, C3 
Please, indicate for the two different choice problems below whether you 208  Homo Oeconomicus 22(2): 191–209 (2005) 
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would prefer option __ or option __: 
(1)  In case of option   you win a monetary prize of f 25 if out of an urn 
containing 100 balls of which 48 are green and 42 are black, and 10 are white, 
the selector randomly selects a green ball. 
In case of option __ you win the same monetary prize of hfl 25 according to 
the following rules: 
Firstly, the selector randomly selects between an urn__ and an urn__ by 
tossing a fair coin. 
In case that urn __ has been selected in this way, the selector must randomly 
select a green ball out of urn __ containing 100 balls of which 10 are green 
and 90 are black. If urn __ has been selected, a green ball must be chosen out 
of urn __ containing 100 balls of which 90 are green and 10 are black. 
I prefer __ 
(2)  In case of option __ you win a monetary prize of hfl 25 if out of an urn 
containing 100 balls of which 40 are green and 50 are black, and 10 are white, 
the selector randomly selects a green ball. 
In case of option   you win the same monetary prize of hfl 25 according to the 
following rules: 
Firstly, the selector randomly selects between an urn __ and an urn __ by 
tossing a fair coin. 
In case that urn __ has been selected in this way, the selector must randomly 
select a green ball out of urn __ containing 100 balls of which 10 are green 
and 90 are black. If urn __ has been selected, a green ball must be chosen out 
of urn__ containing 100 balls of which 90 are green and 10 are black. 
I prefer __ 
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